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ABSTRACT
We find the equilibrium steady state trading strategy for a dealer, or
stock-broker, on an exchange, who gains information from the inflow of
orders and must determine how to release the information to the rest of the
exchange through time. We show that dealer behaviour is motivated by
difl'erences in expected returns and the current order inflow, und
information is released at a slower rate than it is received. This model ol'
dealer behaviour generates increased asset price volatility. We also discuss
the effects of increased competitiveness in the dealer industry and
establish the limiting properties as the industry approaches perfect
competition, in particular the increased volatility persists in the limit.
M I would like to thank Ailsa Roell for many helpful comments that have
substantially improved this paper.1
1. Introduction
Stock-brokers and dealers in financial markets face a flow of buy and
sell ordrn~s from their clients. If they are dual-capacity traders Lhey cun
smooth this flow by holding inventories of the stocks they quote and trading
on tlieir own account. In this paper we investigate the optimal trading
strategy of such a dealer.
It is well known that an optimal purchasing strategy for a dealer in an
envirotiment with asymmetric information is based upon a bid-ask spread: the
dealer buys from clients at a lower price than it sells to them because of
adverse selection; Glosten ~ Milgrom 1985. This approach does not explain
how the dealer determines its optimal inventory by purchasing or selling the
stock to the marketplace from period to period. 1'he traditional story
assumes that any trade is immediately passed on to an organized exchange and
the príces on the exchange come to reflect any information contained in the
trades offered to the dealer. Some reflection reveals that this may well not
be an optimal strategy for the dealer, because by observing the flow of
orders received over the telephone it has gained some information relative
to that available in the market place. Thus the dealer may be able to
exploit the informational advantage this provides in its future trades and
in the level of inventory it holds. In this paper we solve for the optimal
intertemporal strategy of a dealer, taking account of this desire to
manipulate the Flow of information into the market. The model we present
can also be interpreted as an extension of Kyle's (1985) model on informed
trading, to an environment where new information continues to be acquired by
the informed agent.
We show that optimal dealer behaviour will tend to increase the
volatility of asset prices above that observed if the dealer passed on all
orders, thus the presence of dual capacity dealers will tend to contributed
to asset price volatility in excess of that predicted by the underlying flow
of information onto a market. We further show that for any large but finite
set ot' dealers in a particular market the increased level of volatility will
persist, at the limit the price volatility is not restored to the level of'
no dealers.2
There are two main types of explanation for the excessive asset price
volatility noted by Shiller (1981). One class relies on the presence of
liquidity, oc noise, traders in asset markets to explain variances of prices
that are higher than the variance of fundamentals. These explanations rely
on the deus ez machina of noise traders to provide all the additional
variability in prices. In spite of De Long et al. (198~), which goes some
way towards explaining why noise traders exist, such models do not really
explain the additional volatility but place it at one further remove. The
second type of explanation is based on the belief that there is some feature
nf' the structure or organisation of asset markets which promotes volatility
and magnifies the shocks they receive. This work belongs to such a second
class. But, we do not rely on bubbles or weakened rationality (e.g.
chartists) to derive these results. We show that fully rational dealer
behaviour will exaggerate shocks and increase the variance of asset prices.
Tt~e idea that dealers can behave in a systematic way to profitably
manipulate the flow of information onto an exchange first appears in Kyle
(1987). This cesult is vividly demonstrated by an example in the paper which
repays study and so is given below. In the example there is an asset traded
which yields a return of zero or unity at the end of play and each of these
returns are equally probable. There are two types of traders coming to the
dealer; informed, who know the returns, and uninformed who do not. In any
period of time the dealer receives one order and there is a probability c
that the dealer encounters an informed trader in that period. The informed
traders purchase one unit if returns are unity and sell one unit if returns
are zero, whilst the uninformed buy and sell with equal probability. We will
consider what happens over two periods. In the first period the expected
return to the asset, given a sell order, is b-(1-c)~2, and the expected
return given a buy order is a-(l.c)~2, so these will respectively describe
the sell and buy price of the dealer and the market as a whole. These two
prices will differ, because there is adverse selection determining buyers
and sellers. In the second period the sell and buy prices will be; 1~2,
a2~(a2tb2) respectively, if there was a buy order in the first period and
bz~(a2~b2), 1~2 respectively, if there was a sell order in the first period.
Kyle points out that a dealer can make a profit by not passing the orders
that arrive in the first period onto orders on the exchange. If the dealer3
observes a buy-sell or a sell-buy sequence of orders and does not pass these
trades onto the market, then the market prices will not change between the
periods and the dealer is able to make a profit of a-b. This is achieved by
simply averaging these trades over time. However, if a buy-buy or a sell-
sell sequence is observed the dealer can pass these on to the market in the
second period at a loss. The loss is made since in the second period the
dealer is setting the wrong price relative to its information. It is obliged
to charge the same price as the rest of the market in the second period
and ihe market has not observed the first period trades. In spite of these
losses on average the dealer is making a profit, hence Kyle concludes that
dealers can profitably coexist with an efficient exchange. One can fínd this
example objectionable on a number of fronts. There is no explanation of how
the exchange continues if it is on average making a loss. There is the
restriction of the dealer to a one unit order flow in each period. There is
also no proper determination of the dealer's optimal strategy in this model.
These will all be addressed below.
It is worth noting khat in the example dealers tend to pass on large
swings in trade but not small ones, so the question is; how will dealer
behaviour like this affect asset price volatility? In the first period of
the example the dealer completely eliminates the price volatility, whilst in
the second period there may again be no trade or a high volume of trade as
the dealer adjusts its inventories. This second period effect may generate
increased price variability particularly if the dealer dumps a sell-sell or
a buy-buy sequence on the exchange. (Closer inspection of the example
reveals that there is no change in erpected volatility even in the second
period. Such a conclusion, however, rests on an implicit assumption in our
treatment, thnt the mnrket treats two sell orders in Che second pe.riod as
equivalent with a sell order in each period. This is not in general true,
one would expect a larger one-off change in demand to have different effect
on prices to the effects from the sum oF its parts.) So the possibility of
dealers smoothing small shocks in the market's information, but passing on
large shocks, could conceivably either reduce or exacerbate asset price
variability. We will present a model which shows that dealers always tend to
increase price volatility.4
The example above also indicates something about the manner in which
information flows through the dealer onto the market. In each period of the
example new information accrues and instead of flowing smoothly in a
continual stream onto the exchange, the release of information becomes lumpy
and bunched through time. This is in stark contrast to the model of
specialist pricing and information release in Kyle (1985), where the
information in a single signal is released smoothly through time. In an
envi.ronment where dealers are controlling their dissemination of
information, the example predicts that one observes periods where there is a
high level of trade and prices contain a great amount of information, and
other periods where there is less information contained in prices. This may
provide another explanation for the phenomenon of variable patterns of trade
during the day as in Admati 8~ Pfleiderer (1986).
'1'he contents oY' the paper are organized in the following way, section 2
contains a description of the model where there is one dealer and a
definition of an equilibrium, section 3 describes the solution process for
this model, section 4 extends this model to the many dealer case and
examines the questions of price volatility. In Section 5 we examine how
changes in the rules on the pricing of deals may alter the results here.
Section 6 contains a conclusion.
2. A Model of Dealer Behaviour
In the model below we will consider one dealer who has a monopoly of a
particular flow of orders; this in one sense clearly confli.cts with the
belief that the dealer industry is competitive. There is, however, a
fundamental way in which a dealer does have a monopoly over the flow of
orders it observes and so must have information which is distinct from that
observed in the rest of the market. It is this lack of competition which we
are concerned with here and hence we will begin with a model where there is
one dealer who adjusts the flow of orders from clients onto the market. This
allows a simpler exposition of the key features of the many dealer case. We
wil~ also model the dealer as a player with strictly better information than
the rest of the market, because it observes the information contained in its5
order flow. There will clearly be information about returns to stocks other
than that contained in the flow of information to the dealer, but we will
assume this information is commonly available. Hence such information does
not alter the dealer's position of being better informed about its own
observed trades than the market. Hence for a first approximation, it may be
reasonable to abstract from other information flows onto the market and
examine how the dealer optimally releases information contained in the
trades it makes. We will also attack the problem of what happens if there
are a number of different dealers in a market in section 4 to investigate
how this will affect the release of information onto a market.
We will assume there are two players; one player is a dealer who
observes a flow of orders for an asset from clients in each period. In the
light oF this order flow the dealer chooses a demand to place on the
exchange in each period. The second player can be thought of as a market
maker who observes the sequence of total demands from dealers and noise
traders and then sets the price equal to the expected discounted returns
from the asset. The returns to the asset traded are denoted v and this is
dr~Lermined by the sum of a sequence of independent identically disLributed
N(O,og2) random variables gt. Thus the returns to the asset traded follow a
random walk. The realisations of returns are unknown to all agents in the
market until after the final period of play. However, the appropriate
distributions generating the variables are all common knowledge. The play in
the model is assumed to take place during an infinite number of periods
t-..,-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, .. . This allows us to study the steady state of the
model, but it does present a problem of interpretation since it appears that
the returns are never obtained by the dealer in finite time. The intuition
is clear; trading in assets may be very frequent relative to the annual
payment of dividends. One can rationalize our approach by taking
observations t- 0, -1, -2, .. as being players' priors, which are also
observations on the steady state. This truncates the infinite past. We will
also assume that in any period there is a probability y that all information
is re~.ealed and returns realized. Thus returns are actually obtained in
finite time. The value (1-~) acts as an additional discount Factor in the
dealer's objectives, so if b' is the dealer's actual discount factor b-
b'(1-~) is the factor which accounts for the probability of termination.6
The flow of orders to the dealer in period t is informative about the
returns to the stock traded, but there is a noise element which limits the
value of the dealer's information. The order inflow it is equal to
8t~ut'
wtrere ut is an independent identically distributed N(0,6u2) random variable
representing the uninformed noise traders who come to the dealer. The
increment in expected returns 8t is also the demand of a body of informed
tradecs, who place their orders with the dealer. The variance 6u2 alters the
information in the trades that the dealer observes. The dealer is obliged to
meet these demands at the prices that reign on the exchange in the
period the order inflow arrives. Within that period the dealer chooses
a different demand or order outflow ot to place on the market in the light
of the observed order inflow. The dealer's inventory will, of course, be
adjusY.ed at the rate (ot-8t-ut) per period. There are many ways in which
~lurrl crrpncit.y lraders nre constrained in pricing ~;hnres, Roell (19f39). In
Lundon Lhe dealers must ot'fer Che best currently quoted price, in Ituly
banks offer the next market clearing price, Roell (1989 pl.). The assumption
that dealers offer the current market clearing price is a reasonable
approximation to this. The informed traders might object to dealers passing
on their information and so also benefiting from it. They may also object to
dealers (themselves) being net purchasers of the assét when there is a net
demand from clients; (we show that dealers always behave in this way below).
For these reasons we also consider in Section 5 the possibility that dealers
cannot immediately act on information in order inflows. The results here
substantiate all our conclusions under the original pricing hypothesis.
The market maker does not observe the private flow of orders to the
dealer, but instead observes the sum of orders from all agents in the market
(including the dealer) in each period. All other information is common
knowledge, so the market maker will interest itself only in the flow of
orders from the dealer ot as these will be the only informative data on the
returns to the asset. The market maker's observations of the dealer's orders
2
will be disturbed by some independent and identically distributed N(0,6w )
noise trade wt. Tlrus in each period prices pt are set to satisfy
pt - E~~~qt'qt-1~.. ]. where qt:-ot~wt. (1)7
This formalisation of market prices improves on the example, because the
market correctly accounts for the optimal strategy of the dealer when
forming expected returns and hence prices. In particular the market will not
be expecting to make losses, because it is allowing for the behaviour of the
dealer who sits on the order stream and derives information.
To complete the model we must now describe the dealer's objectives. At
the beginning of each time period the dealer chooses a level of ot to
maximise the discounted value of its future expected profits, given its own
private information on its current and past order flow and the state of the
market's information. This is the usual dynamic programming approach and as
such has the credibility properties associated with a sequential
equilibrium. This model cannot be placed in a proper game-theoretic form as
there has been no specification of the market maker's objectives and the
game tree is doubly infinite. We will assume that the dealer has a discount
factor of b:-(1-~-)b' and acts to maximise the discounted value of expected
profits




For all t, it, it-1 "'
(z)
The factor y-y~(1-b) discounts returns to the date they are received. Lines
(1) and (2) in effect describe the equilibrium condition for this model. In
(2) it is clear that the dealer is not constrained to balance its books in
the stock in any period, instead we allow the dealer to be able to build up
a position or go short in the stock it is trading. This appears to be the
correct modelling approach for a number of reasons, first we should not
constrain the dealer to balance its books in a stock but instead explain why
it is optimal for the dealer to behave in this way. If such a constraint is
observed in practise it must surely be a consequence of some optimizing
behaviour from the dealer, hence the correct approach is to examine how
dealers act if unconstrained. Second, it seems unreasonable to restrict the
dealer from building a profitable position in the stock if it is able to do8
this. There are obviously a number of ways in which dealers can gain from
using their inside information and this is one of the most obvious.
3- The Optimal Form of Uealer E3ehaviour
The solution process for this model proceeds in two steps, we first
posit a form for the dealer's optimal strategy and deduce the way in which
the market will extract information from knowledge of its structure. Then,
given the market will behave in this way, determine the optimal response of
the dealer and show that this optimal response is indeed of the form first
suggested. Finally one can solve for the coefficients of the optimal
strategy: this solution technique owes a great deal to that found in
Cukierman 8~ Meltzer (1986) or Kyle (1985). The solution technique does have
the deficiency that we have restricted our search for equilibria to those
which are oF the form first postulated. There may be other types of
equilibria which are not discovered by thís process. It is important to note
that in employing this solution technique we have not restricted the
dealer's actions in any way; the dealer's optimal response to the belief
formation by the market is completely unrestricted. It simply turns out that
this response is of the form first postulated. Second, the linear quadratic
Gaussian nature of the model leads one to have strong faith in the essential
linearity of the solution we find, moreover, we can exclude the possibility
of a multiplicity of solutions due to beliefs off the equilibrium path since
every information set is on the equilibrium path. This must also imply that
no inadmissible strategies are used by players in equilibrium.
The first step is to guess a form for the optimal strategy for the dealer,
this consists of describing the way ot is chosen at every point in time for
every state, we will assume
ot - ait ~ aEtv i ~pt-1~ (3)
Here a.g and ~r are constants yet to be determined. The first term in this
expression represents the new information observed in period t, Etv is the
dealer's expected value for returns in period t and the variable pt-19
represents the market's expected returns in period t-1. These last two
variables describe all the relevant information on the state of players'
information in period t. Thus the strategy postulated dces respond to the
level of both p1:3yers' information about the returns at each period of time.
The market observes the past sequence of variables qt- ott wt, from
these observations it will infer something about the values yt and hence v.
Given the linear form of the dealer's strategy postulated in (3) this
process of inference will be the exponential weighting of observations given
below (this follows from the standard least squares projection result and is
given in detail in the appendix)
E[v
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(Henceforward we will use the notation Et to denote expectations taken
relative to the dealer's available information at time t, so this notation
is equivalent to the notation E[.~it,it-l,it-Z...] used above.) The
equivalent expected returns for the dealer Etv can also be solved applying
the well known conditional expectation properties of the normal distribution
Etv - p ~ it-j. Using the information given in these statements we can now
j-0
complete the description oF the determination of prices. Prices have been
determined as a function of past values of qt, by employing ( 1) and (4) we
have
pt - ( ~ ~ H~(9t-j - ~pt-j-1).
j-0io
Leading once, multiplying the above by u and differencing gives the
following difference equation in pt' pt-~t-1 -(1~ (qt - Ypt-1)' Solving
for pt-1 gives
pt - ( -~ ~ ~~qt-j ~~-u-(~y~ ~ j-p ~
(5)
We have now determined prices in this model and explained how the dealer
forms its beliefs on returns, it remains to determine Lhe dealer's optimal
behaviour. The first step is to take (5) and substitute it into the dealer's
objertivcs (2)
E [ ~ br-t(wv-(1-~) ~ ~~q -.)(o -i )]. t r-t ~ j-p r ~ r r
Now optimize, by calculating the value for ot which maximizes the above.
This can be found from the first order condition, or so called Euler
equation, for the model
t[yv-Pt(ot-it) (1-u) - (~ F (b~)r-tor].
~ ~ r-tf1
Rearranging this and substitution from (5) for pt gives the following
relation describing the dealer's optimal strategy
2ot - it .,SW ~ Etv - 0~~~qt-1-j l~ x~ j-~ ~ (b~)r-tor
r-tt1
(6)
Now lead this once take expectations relative to Et of the cesulting
equation and thPn multiply through by mb and difference, this gives:
(2-0b)ot-mbEtot41 - it . (1-mb)~ Etv-0(1-S~Z)J~O~j9t-1-j~
Lead this once and multiply the above by ~ taking expectations relative to




mbEttrr.2 - 2Etot.r.1 ` ~Et t.r - - ~(1-ra)(1-mb)Et~. (8)
The characteristic equation of the difference equations in (~) and (8) have
the roots
i: 1-e2b let 1- 1-~2b
b~ ~ - bra
If -1~~C1, one oF these roots is stable and the other is unstable. It is
unlikely that the dealer will expect its sales in the market to become
unboundedly large in the future. Also any such behaviour will conflict with
the transversality condition attached to the optimization above. Hence we
will deFine ~ to be the stable root and treat it as the only solution to the
difference equations. As a result the solution to (8) is
r-1
Etotir - ~r } (Ettrl-~~)~
r21
~~ - (1-0)(1-Ob) ~ E v.
2-0-0b 1-y, t
(9)
'I'his solution together with (~) can be employed to determine Etottl'
Substitute from (9) for EtttZ into (~), then rearrange to solve for Etottl
gives
E o - ~ (o -i ) . ~ g ~ (1-ó)(1-~b)(2-ra- 0b) (10)
t tFl 2-b~~ t t 1-N t 2-~b~ Z-m-rab
Employing (10) and (9) we can now calculate the sum at the end of (6) and
hence determine the dealer's optimal strategy. To do this we must now let
the time when the value of the asset is realised tend to infinity, otherwise
the value of the last term on the right of (6) will be dependent on the time
periud. The idea behind this device is to model the notion that there are a
large number of periods between today's trade and the point in time when12
returns are received. One means of achieving this end would be to recast the
model as a discrete approximation to continuous time with a finite horizon
T, but an infinite set of periods between zero and T. To do this the
variances must be multiplied by a term (pt), which denotes the period
length, and discount factors are bet~ the limits are taken as eta0. This
seems unnecessarily cumbersome, hence we will simply let horizons be
unboundedly large. The solution to (6) after calculation of the sum
Et~(~b)rot.r
becomes
[`} 2-0b~2b1-0b~ , ot - (1} 2-~S~2b1-mb~ ,lt
. (1-~2b2(1-~)(1- ) - 0b(1-0)(1-0b)(2-0- 0b)1 ~ E v
l 1-mbf 2-~-~b 1-mb~ 2-~b~ 2-~-~b J 1-K t
- ~ (1-u m j
1-u l S j~0 0 qt-1-j,.
Division by the factor on the left and substitution for pt-1 reveals that
(11) does have the form first postulated for the optimal strategy;
ot- alt{
~Etv ~~pt-1. All that remains is to solve for the coefficients ~,~,~ by
equating these with the appropriate expressions in (11). First take y and
equate this with the expression above, substitute for ~ from its definition,
ttien substitute for ~ in the definition of ~(5). This can be used to
establish
2y~
a - lrbu2. (12)




b(1-y)~1 t- 2-w .13
Taking the stable solution
H - ~(i-J 2`-b). (13)
These facts can then be used to completely characterise the coefficients a,
~, ~ of the dealer's supply. We have now succeeded in characterising the
dealer's optimal strategy in this model and it is indeed a linear function
of today's new information it and the two state variables pt-1, Etv. These
respectively describe the state of the market's information on returns and
the state of the dealer's own private information on returns.
The sign of ~ is particularly significant, and it appears that the
dealer acts in a way which is negatively related to the market's expected
returns from the asset traded. Nence it will prefer to supply the asset when
high returns are expected by the market and when the level of returns the
dealer expects are relatively low. When the converse is true it will prefer
to purchase the asset from the market place.
lf the value (a3p~-1) is calculated we can work out the extent to which
the dealer's inventory changes in response to order inflows (since ot-it-
(a-1)itiSEtv4~pt-1).
Some algebra gives ~-x. Then to determine ~ we must
solve x2-~Nt1-0. This gives
(a-1'P~) ) 0.
Order inflows in isolation from their information content lead to a
reducr.ion in inventory levels, but this ignores the informational effects
which in fact lead to offsetting increases in inventories. The magnitude of
the parameter s implies that inventories actually increase in response to a
tiet demand from clients. Thus dealers act to supply their clients and also
purchase the asset on their own account. One may, therefore, say that
dealers trade against their clients, Roell 1989- The informed clients do not
necessarily loose because of this. If the variance of cioise trade is
relatively large it is quite possible that dealers are net purchasers of the
asset, whilst the clients are net sellers.14
The relative sizes of the parameters ~ and ~ determines the
informational content of the market maker's new observations. The rate at
which the market learns, or acquires new information, from the dealer is
determined by the dealer's discount factor b( 12). Dealers with higher
discount factors select strategies with a higher weight u in the signal
extraction problem. Thus as dealers become less myopic they choose a
strategy which reduces the informational content of current actions. This
implies that the market maker places more weight on past information when
solving its signal extraction problem.
4. Many Dealers and Price Volatility
In this section we show how the model solved above can be extended to
solve for the case with a fixed finite number of dealers. This is then used
to examine the price variability of a market with optimal dealer behaviour.
We also address the question of how changes in the degree of competitiveness
among dealers changes the properties of the equilibrium we have discovered
and ask whether as the number of dealers becomes large we approach a fully
competitive market.
In the one dealer model a flow of orders presented themselves to the
single dealer in every period. We now assume there are n identical dealers
with identical discount factors operating in the market, with objectives
equivalent to those described in (2). Each dealer trades at the market price
and we assume there is no significant non-price competition between dealers.
hence from the poínt of view of the customer one dealer is identical to
another. Thus we let the noise traders ut be randomly allocated to dealers,
so dealers have equal levels of noise trade. Once each dealer has an equal
proportion of noise trade the informed clients are also indifferent between
dealers, Roell (1989). Thus in each period the order inflow of any dealer is
nit. We will assume that it is common knowledge that customers are so-
allocated.
Now postulate a form for the symmetric equilibrium strategy of dealer i15
(14)
oC- n~it r ~Etv .
~Pt-1~
Given de~ilers adopt such a strategy total demand facing the merket maker in
any pc~ríod satisfies qt-a'it'f3~Etv`Y~pL-1'wt as in section 3. Thus, the
signal extraction problem faced by Lhe market maker has r~n identical
solution to that described in the appendix. Hence mutatis mutandfs define u'
to be the appropriate weight for the signal extraction problem and dealer
i's optimízation problem becomes
Max E~ bJ(w~-(~~ ~ qt-J)(ot-J- nlt-J)~
(15)
t~-p p ~-p
The first order condition for this problem, the analogue of equation (6),
wíll be
( p'W k - ol i li -~ bJOJott. .




Summing these over all dealers i gives an equation for total supply
~1' E v-np ~ tdk4 - E ~ bJOJq i (i6) (n.l)Et4t-itt n 1-u~ t k-O t-1-k t~-1
t ~.
This relation can then be transformed in the manner described by (6) through
(8), To give a difference equation for
Etqt~s
n~bEt9t,2- (n-1)Et9t.1 ~ ~Etqt - ~lt - ~ (1-0)(1-~b)Etv.
Taking the stable root and substituting into (15) gives the form of the
equilibrium strategy as in (11). Employing equivalent operations to those
described in section 3 we can show thato - (ntl~
nóu2rl~
16
u' ' Zbn I(n'1)T' - (T')Z(n,l)2-bnl~




a' - nil - y.'
ltbn(1- )
T' - l4n 1-w .
(17)
The ratio of ~'~p' is, of course, determined from the definition of u in
(4). This completes the description of all the aggregate variables in this
equilibrium. We will not verify that given aggregate behaviour is of this
form then individual behaviour of each dealer must also be. This is based
largely upon the first order conditions (16).
Let us first examine how increases in the number of dealers and hence
increased competitiveness affects the behaviour of market prices. First
consider the rate at which new information is reflected in prices, that is
the determination of the parameter u' in the signal extraction problem. As n
increases the value u' decreases, tending to zero as n tends to infinity.
As the dealers become closer to a competitive industry their equilibrium
strategy results in current actions being very informative, relative to past
information. There is thus little difference between the information of
dealers and the information of the market. The reason for this can be seen
if we note that as n tends to infinity so does a' tend to zero. The dealer's
strategy consequently places less weight on the new information and gets to
be responsive only to their expectations of returns. This is precisely the
information the rest of the market is seeking to learn. Also, as n becomes
large so does the ratio y'~~' tend to minus one. Hence, as the dealer
industry becomes competitive it is simply the difference between the beliefs
of the dealers and the beliefs reigning in the market place which motivates
dealers to trade. This is the sole remaining motive for trade once their17
market power and ability to influence the market's information acquisition
has vanished. The extent to which this motivates dealers in a fully
competitive industry can be seen if we solve for p' from (4) as y~ tends to
r.r~rc,. This dr~m~~nstralr~~; thnt. ~3' becomes unboundedly lrrrge, and any
di~:crcl~nncy beLween mrrrk~~L's nnd denler5' iufurmal,iun nberut rr~l.urns Lo the
asset will result in very large swings in dealers positions to restore the
balance between expectations. In summary, as n becomes large the behaviour
does approach the perfectly competitive outcome. Any difference in
information would result in large swings of trade, and so dealers and market
have the same levels of information. We will show below that the level of
price volatility does not converge to the competitive level but stays at a
higher level.
Clianges in dealers' discount factors produce similar effects to those
in the one-agent case. We can also assess the impact of changes in the
informativeness of dealers' signals using the parameter p. As this shrinks
so does the proportion of noise in the dealers' order inflow increase. By
(16) the parameters H and rx will not be affected by a change in p, however,
p and y must both respond to this change. A decrease in p generates a higher
value of ~ and ~. Hence, as current signals become less informative on
returns dealers' equilibrium strategies become more responsive to their
beliefs on returns. This increases the relative information on returns in
their period-to-period behaviour and thus preserves the optimal rate of
learning by the players in the market.
The rate of learning by the market is the key feature of the optimal
dealer strategy, it is this which determines how much profits dealers are
able to generate. In the first example we saw that it was a dealer's ability
to slow or stop the market's information acquisition, which generates a
dealer's profit opportunities. Similarly, in this more complex model profit
opportunities come from delaying the learning of the market and trading this
off against the potential risks of future adverse information. Thus, it is
the discount factor and the number of competitors which determines p, and
hence all other features of the solution.1i~
4.1 Price Volatility
We now try to compare the price volatility in these models of dealer
behaviour with the price volatility in the absence of dealers. The benchmark
against which we measure volatility will be determined by the equilibrium
that reigns when the market maker observes the sum of the dealers' order
inflow and noise trade; itt wt. We will show that dealer behaviour always
incc.eases the variability of prices over this benchmark. We consider two
difff~rent ways of ineasuring price variability. First, the variance of prices
is used. This is noC the usual way of ineasuring price volatility. Shiller
(1981) employs a measure
Var[pt-pt-l~pt-1~
so we also compare this measure.
A natural measure of price volatility would be the unconditional
variance of prices, however, given the assumed infinite past in the model
this variance is unboundedly large. To avoid this problem we treat periods;
-1,-2,-3,.. , as past history, which can be conditioned upon in the
calculation of the variances. Hence we compare the price variances in period
t conditional upon a particular past history for a given regime. Obviously
as t becomes large the conditioning becomes increasingly less important,
moreover, the particular events during the past have no effect on the values
of these variances. We will also interest ourselves in the rate at which
these variances would grow as t tends to infinity.
r
Suppose there are no dealers, so the market maker observes qt- it. wt in
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V[pt~l-1~ - 2 ~ (t.l).
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t~0.
Here I-1 represents the information set of the market makers before time
zero. To calculate the conditional variance in period t in the presence of
dealers we use the fact that19
(~ ~ ~ i ~ E v t w
pt- l~,
F u(a t-j ~ t-j t-j).
j-0
USlllg a similar upperoacli Lo that Laken in the appendix and correctly
evalueting all the finiLe geometric progressions, one can calculate the
variance of this to be
2 r
V~ptll-1~ - aw (1~ (1-y~t~2) a (1-2) (agr au) I ~~ (tal)
P u ~ ` (1-u )
tt2 2tt4 ( 1
.~ 1-~ X. X2 1-i-u2 1 .1 X- a-~j.
To compare the two expressions it is simply a matter of comparing terms with




Therefore we can conclude that ttie activity of dealers will always tend to
increase price variances. Furthermore, for any given past history price
variances with the presence of dealers grows at a faster rate then in their
absence. These properties are also robust to changes in period length. As
the time period pt betwcen trnding periods shrinks b tends to unity and the
variances aé, au. aW are multiplied by a factor pt. 'l'he ineyuality betweeu
these two variances is preserved.
If one measures volatility using the variance of the difference of
prices one must calculate
2
M ~ a8
pt-Pt-1 - 2 2 2(it } wt)
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Now calculating the conditional variances
(as)2 . .
Var[pt-Pt-l~pt-1~ - 62 t 62 4 02
g u w
Var[pt-Pt-l~pt-1] - Í1-x)ZÍ~ t p)2VarCit]
2
' ~1-N)2Var[Et-lv~pt-1~ ' ~1-2)
dw
~
If we let the number of dealers tend to infinity we have
(az)2
Var(Pt-Pt-l~t't-1~ ~ og 3 6U . lim
Var[Et-1v~Pt:-1~
This clearly exceeds the variance when dealers are not present. Using both
measures of price volatility we have now shown that the presence of dealers
exacerbates price volatility and that this result happens even as
competition approaches perfect competition.
This result appears odd given the arguments given above that as the
dealer industry becomes more competitive so information transmission from
dealers to the industry becomes more transparent. Ilowever, if one views
these results in the light of those on information transmission in Kyle 1989
it should be clear that there may continue to be incentives to effect the
informational context of prices even as agents become insignificant.
Similarly, it is quite possible for dealer activity to affect aggregate
variability even as dealers become individually small.
5. A Different Pricing Rule for Dealers
We have shown that dealers will always trade against the order stream,
so they are net sellers when their clients are also selling ttie asset and
net buyers when their clients buy. In this section we consider what liappenszl
when dealers do not trade against their clients in this way. We suppose that
the clients of a dealer; informed or uninformed; are able to insist that
dealers do not trade on their current information in the market. Instead
dealers must wait one period before they can act on the information they
have acquired from their order inflow. This implies that the information
relevant to ttie price in period t is that observed by the dealer in period
t-1. In effect the dealers must pay the price in period t-1 to the order
inflow in period t. Below we solve for the steady state strategy of the
dealer wtien it is forced to pay a price pt-1 to today's order inflow.
Each dealer's optimization problem now becomes
max Et ~ br-t {Wv(or-ir) - prr} pr-lir}.
r-t
Since dealers cannot react to it in the period that it is observed, the
first term in ttie dealer's optimal strategy vanishes and we will postulate
the following form for each dealer's actions
ot - n SEtv } n ~pt-1'
We use the notation g, y for the dealer's strategy but these denote
different values to those used previously. The signal extraction problem
faced by the market is identical to the one solved in the appendix with a-0.
K - (8~2) - (B~2)Z-1
2
p : 2 r PL
W
Now as above substitute for pr and pr-1 in the dealers' objective functions
and solve for the Euler conditions
(n.l)qt - lu yEtv - nm F m~qt-l-j- Et F~jb~9t~~.
j-0 j-122
Comparison with the equivalent condition (16) shows that the only difference
here is the absence of the first term on the right in it. The absence of
this term considerably simplifies the solution of Etqt~~, but the same
procedure ís followed to give the optimal strategy
c{ - r 1-Ee~b 1r1 0b(1- )( 1-vt) 1~ ~: v
L lnrt-ngObJl -~-~mb n~l-m-n0b 1 1-p t
~
- (nal-n~rdb)n~ ~~C ~,qt-j~







ib - ~1 b ~i-1.
~ 1-H nbN2r1
Therefore the coeFFicients (y,p) of the optimal strategy when the dealer is
constrained to offer last period's price are identical to those found in
Section 4.
The strategy of the dealers in Lhis section is identical to that in the
previous section apart from the constraint that a-0 here. Thus, all the
analysis of the form of the dealers' optimal strategy also applies to the
case where dealers are constrained to offer last periods price to thier
clients. The results on increased competition in this case are precisely
equivalent, because we showed that oc' tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
This also ensures that the results on price volatility of Section 4.1 also
hold true in this section.
'l'o conclude, iC we allow E'or Lhe facC that the clients ol' denlers are
reluctant to allow dealers to trade ngainst them, we cun again use the
techniques developed here to discover the form of the steady state strategy.z3
Its form is identical to the strategy in Section 4 with a-0. All the results
on excess volatility are still true in this case.
6. Conclusions
We have found an equilibrium for a model where dealers gain information
from their private ínflow of orders. They then release this information to
the merket in a manner which optimally provides them with opportunities to
profit from trade. It is the dealers' ebility to slow the markets rate of
learning which crcates Lhe opportunity for the dealers to make profits; just
as is the case in our initial exaurple. 1'his has n number of effects. lt
increases the volatility of the asset market price and it slows the rate at
which the information is released onto the market. We have also established
that dealer behaviour converges to a perfectly competitive limit, where
there is still increased pcice volatility. Ficrally, it seems possible to
view these results as support for the results of Hart 8. Kreps (1986) that
speculation may increase price volatility by furnishing an example where it
invariably has this effect.
Apperidi x
Elegin by notíng that E[vlqt,...] is equivalent to the conditional
expectation of v given the variables
dt'-qt-~pt-1
since at the tiee
expectations are taken the data ~pt-1 are common knowledge. Given the
linearity of the structure we can employ the least squares projection result
to deduce that the conditional expectation is linear in the data, hence
E[v~dt.-.] - F ~jdt-j~ j-0
And the coefficients aj minimise the expected squared prediction error
[{v - F ~jdt-j}z] - E[{v - ~ ~j(acit-j ~ ~Et-jvrwt-j)}2]
j-0 j-024
EC{{j~p st-j) - ,~paj(ocit-j ~ HPk~plt-j-k)4wt-j)}2]'
Noting that it - 8t'ut and rearranging gives









Now differentiate this with respect to ~j and lead the resulting equation
once and difference with the original, this gives
0 - 692{-(ot'AP)C1-~j(~4AP)-aj-1PA-..] - pCl-ajtl(tt'f3P)-..]} r
~ 6u2((a~Pl3)Laj(a4Pí3)t~j-1..] - pCajal(~{Plj)a~j,.)} f
4 (aj-aj.l)6w2'
Lead once and difference again gives
Z r r ~ oc Á. ( aCF )'~j ~ 4 0- 6j {-{a Ap)L~jil(~ AP)-~jot] C ~t2 AP ~1 ]}
~ ou~ ({tr'pJt) I -~ j t l(~.~iJí)
' ot~~ I-~sI -~ ~~L~(ts~~~fi) ' a~j
r l I) t
(A.1)
2
t (aj-2aji1~ ~j.2)dw .25




B- 2~ r(a )2 t u t~ 1-1
l Ps pg2 P~J
The only stable solution to this difference equation is of the form a~ z Cu~
where N is as defined in (4). To Find the value for the constant C take
(A.1) when j-0 and substitute from ~~-Cx~.
pQs2 - C{[li(ppla))Z - (Sp~oc) - a(li(13P~a))~ t (1-A)pPu~(ot)2}
Now use the fact that u2-BU.1-0; substitute for B and rearrange to solve for
po, ttien substitute this into the above and solve for C. This gives C~
(1-}~)~~.
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